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ABSTRACT 
 
A Novel Authentication and Validation Mechanism for  
 
Analyzing Syslogs Forensically 
 
by 
 
Steena D. S. Monteiro, Master of Science 
 
Utah State University, 2008 
Major Professor: Dr. Robert F. Erbacher 
Department: Computer Science 
 
This research proposes a novel technique for authenticating and validating syslogs 
for forensic analysis. This technique uses a modification of the Needham Schroeder 
protocol, which uses nonces (numbers used only once) and public keys. Syslogs, which 
were developed from an event-logging perspective and not from an evidence-sustaining 
one, are system treasure maps that chart out and pinpoint attacks and attack attempts. 
Over the past few years, research on securing syslogs has yielded enhanced syslog 
protocols that focus on tamper prevention and detection. However, many of these 
protocols, though efficient from a security perspective, are inadequate when forensics 
comes into play. From a legal perspective, any kind of evidence found at a crime scene 
needs to be validated. In addition, any digital forensic evidence when presented in court 
needs to be admissible, authentic, believable, and reliable. Currently, a patchy log on the 
server side and client side cannot be considered as formal authentication of a wrongdoer. 
This work presents a method that ties together, authenticates, and validates all the entities 
involved in the crime scene—the user using the application, the system that is being used, 
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and the application being used on the system by the user. This means that instead of 
merely transmitting the header and the message, which is the standard syslog protocol 
format, the syslog entry along with the user fingerprint, application fingerprint, and 
system fingerprint are transmitted to the logging server. The assignment of digital 
fingerprints and the addition of a challenge response mechanism to the underlying 
syslogging mechanism aim to validate generated syslogs forensically.   
         (61 pages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For my parents who have always supported and encouraged my love for science and 
learning through the years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
A great deal of thanks goes out to Dr. Robert F. Erbacher for his immense support, 
patience, knowledge, and guidance. My work is most certainly a reflection of these. His 
unfailing confidence in me has always been an encouraging factor during certain 
challenging phases of my research. I would like to thank Dr. Chad Mano for encouraging 
me during my first semester to do a master’s thesis and for introducing me to the 
wonderful world of wireless security through his class. Also, I would like to thank Dr. 
Dan Watson for being on my committee.  
A thank you to all my lab mates (and friends), and my special friends in the Computer 
Science Department for their unwavering support, help, and jolly company without which 
my work in the lab, at my research, and at school would have been mundane and dull. It 
is always a pleasure to work with you and discuss the “finer aspects” of security, forensic 
evidence, and random geek humor.  
My family, though thousands of miles away, has been my emotional backbone 
through my time here at Utah State University. I would like to acknowledge and thank 
parents for their love, sacrifices, and support through the past years. They have made me 
what I am today. Also, I’d like to express my gratitude to my small (I like this word!) 
sister Simonah, who firmly maintains that her sister can excel at anything; wherever and 
whenever. 
Lastly, and not in any means a small measure, I would like to thank Infant Jesus for 
guiding, guarding, and blessing me. 
Steena D.S. Monteiro 
 
vii 
 
CONTENTS 
Page 
ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. vi 
 
LIST OF TABLES...............................................................................................................x 
 
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... xi 
 
CHAPTER 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................1 
 
1.1 Background..................................................................................................1 
1.2 Syslog BSD..................................................................................................1 
 
1.2.1 Simplicity ........................................................................................2 
1.2.2 Flexibility ........................................................................................2 
 
1.3 Syslog Security Research.............................................................................3 
1.4 Syslog Tools.................................................................................................3 
1.5 Importance of this Research.........................................................................3 
 
2. SYSLOGS................................................................................................................6 
 
2.1 Syslogs Thus Far..........................................................................................6 
2.2 Background of the Proposed Method ..........................................................7 
2.3 Previous Syslog Research ...........................................................................8 
2.4 Weaknesses of the Syslog Protocol ...........................................................11 
 
2.4.1.  Compromising the Authenticity........................................................11 
2.4.2.  Compromising the Confidentiality ..................................................12 
2.4.3.  Compromising the Integrity .............................................................12 
 
2.5 Forensic Requirements...............................................................................13 
 
2.5.1 Preservation ........................................................................................14 
2.5.2 Identification ......................................................................................14 
2.5.3 Extraction ...........................................................................................14 
2.5.4 Documentation ...................................................................................15 
2.5.5 Interpretation of Data .........................................................................15 
2.5.6 Confidentiality....................................................................................15 
viii 
 
2.5.7 Integrity ..............................................................................................16 
2.5.8 Authenticity ........................................................................................17 
 
2.6 Syslog Variants ..........................................................................................17 
 
2.6.1 Syslog-Sign ........................................................................................17 
2.6.2 Syslog-Auth........................................................................................18 
 
3. THE PROPOSED METHOD ................................................................................19 
 
3.1 Overview of the Proposed Method ............................................................19 
3.2 The Proposed Method................................................................................21 
 
3.2.1 Phase 1: User Authentication............................................................21 
3.2.2 Phase 2: System Connection Establishment .....................................22 
3.2.3 Phase 3: System Connection Establishment Response.....................22 
3.2.4 Phase 4: Application Event Entry Generation ..................................23 
3.2.5 Phase 5: Application Termination ....................................................23 
3.2.6 Phase 6: System Connection Termination ........................................23 
 
4. FINGERPRINTS AND AUTHENTICATION TRACES ....................................24 
 
4.1 User Fingerprints .......................................................................................24 
4.2 Application Fingerprints ............................................................................25 
4.3 System Fingerprints ...................................................................................26 
4.4 Fingerprint Generation...............................................................................27 
 
4.4.1 User Fingerprint Generation .............................................................27 
4.4.2 System Fingerprint Generation .........................................................28 
4.4.3 Application Fingerprint Generation..................................................29 
 
4.5 Authentication Traces ................................................................................30 
4.6 Nonces .......................................................................................................30 
 
5. ATTACK BACKTRACKING...............................................................................32 
 
5.1 Backtracking to an Attack .........................................................................32 
5.2 Reconstructing Fingerprints ......................................................................34 
 
6. FORENSIC VIABILITY ......................................................................................36 
 
6.1 Requirements of Forensic Evidence .........................................................36 
6.2 Evidence Certainty Levels ........................................................................36 
6.3 Authentication Traces and Syslogs under Certain Scenarios ...................38 
 
 6.3.1 Scenario One: Syslog File Deletion..................................................38 
ix 
 
 6.3.2 Scenario Two: Spurious Entry Injection into the Syslog File...........39 
 6.3.3 Scenario Three: Application Updates ...............................................39 
 
7. PROTOCOL RESILENCE....................................................................................41 
 
7.1 Attacks Against the Challenge Response System......................................41 
 
7.1.1 Phase 2: System Connection Establishment .....................................41 
7.1.2 Phase 3: System Connection Establishment Response.....................41 
7.1.3 Phase 4: Application Event Entry Generation ..................................42 
7.1.4 Phase 5: Applications Termination...................................................42 
7.1.5 Phase 6: System Connection Termination ........................................42 
 
7.2 Attacks Against the Syslog File.................................................................42 
7.3 Denial of Service........................................................................................43 
7.4 Abusing Privileges .....................................................................................43 
7.5 Application Updates...................................................................................43 
 
8. CONCLUSION......................................................................................................45 
 
8.1 Current Scenarios.......................................................................................45 
8.2 Future Work ...............................................................................................46 
 
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................48 
 
 
x 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table                          Page 
6.2 Mapping the certainty levels defined in [2] to syslog files....................................37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figures              Page 
3-1 View one of overview of the proposed method.....................................................19 
3-2 View two of overview of the proposed method.....................................................21 
4-1 User fingerprint generation ....................................................................................28 
4-2 System fingerprint generation................................................................................30 
4-3 Application fingerprint generation.........................................................................31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Computer evidence has become an indispensible factor in proving criminal and 
civil cases in a court of law. Previously, the lack and/or misinterpretation of computer 
evidence have been the primary causes for stalling the pursuit of computer crime 
cases in court. Due to the lack of a formal forensic procedure, the interpretation of 
computer evidence at a crime scene has been often best left to expert witness 
testimonies. The federal rules of evidence now consider and treat computer evidence 
as they would documentary evidence. This means that like documentary evidence, 
computer evidence needs to be verified and authenticated. It is now mandatory for 
forensic computer expert witnesses to be able to concretely verify and defend their 
observations and inferences with regard to the processes followed and the tools used 
at the crime scene. Therefore, it is extremely important that computer evidence 
processing be done correctly in criminal cases. A crucial aspect of computer evidence 
is the documentation associated with it [1].   
1.2 Syslog BSD 
Syslogs, as defined by the syslog Berkeley software distribution (BSD) protocol, 
were developed as event reporting systems. This protocol aimed to serve as an 
indication that events with certain priorities occurred over time on a network. The 
protocol assumes every entity to be independent of each other and does not provide 
for any kind of binding mechanism in place when events are associated with multiple 
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entities on the network. The syslog protocol was devised with the following 
fundamental tenets in mind. 
1.2.1 Simplicity 
Syslogs rely on the integrity of the underlying system that implements it for its 
security. The original BSD protocol does not have any security considerations in place 
for securing or protecting the messages that are transferred to and from the systems on 
the network and the central logging repository. Therefore, after the transmission of a 
syslog message, no explicit notification is sent out to the system that generates it.  
With protocol simplicity as the basic focus, UDP is the designated protocol used [2] 
to transmit syslogs generated by the systems on the network to a centralized logging 
system. The simple format of a syslog entry and the vulnerable protocol used to transmit 
it makes syslogs very unsubstantial evidence and causes the integrity of the entries can be 
challenged [3]. 
1.2.2 Flexibility 
Syslogs are flexible in the sense that an administrator on a network can configure 
logging settings and logging paths. This means that the .conf file can be modified in order 
to change logging settings on the network. Additionally, the administrator can determine 
the message logging procedure. For example, messages of higher priority get logged on a 
different server, messages signaling the launch of applications to another, etc. 
Thus, having been developed as electronic signaling systems for a network, syslogs 
do not have any mechanism in place that meets the security goals of authenticity, 
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confidentiality, and integrity. With this as the prime focus, security research has focused 
on cementing the existing syslog with various new techniques and methods. 
 
1.3 Syslog Security Research 
Security research has worked on enhancing syslogs in two ways: remodeling the 
existing syslog protocol and suggesting various architectures, which add a level of 
security to log files as a whole. This is discussed in Chapter 2, which looks at the 
background of syslogs and their security. 
 
1.4 Syslog Tools 
In order for any kind of evidence to be used in a court of law, it has to be deemed as 
admissible, authentic, believable, and reliable. Currently, there are several commercial 
tools available in the market that can be used to analyze the humongous amount of 
information that syslogs contain. These tools basically classify the information that a log 
file contains. Another trait common to all these tools is that none of them assigns any 
kind of forensic credibility to the entities involved in the generation of log entries. 
Further, most tools concentrate all attention on the final and central log file, and the 
collation and categorization of the information that it contains [4].  
 
1.5  Importance of This Research 
! Electronic evidence in a court of law is now treated in the same way as 
documentary evidence. This means that similar to its real-world counterpart, 
electronic evidence needs to satisfy similar phases of evidence authentication and 
validation. Thus, electronic evidence has to be made admissible, authentic, 
believable, and reliable.  
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! Forensic analysis can never be carried out on the actual artifact. The analysis is 
required to be carried out on copies of the artifact. The method proposed in this 
research satisfies this requirement, thereby satisfying a crucial forensic 
requirement.  
! The mechanism proposed in this research has successfully assigned an identity, 
i.e., a fingerprint, to every entity involved in the generation of a syslog entry, 
thereby overwriting the principle of the original syslog BSD that emphasizes the 
independence of every entity.  
! An attacker who attacks a network and causes havoc will firstly seek to eliminate 
any kind of evidence that indicates the presence of the attack or the attacker. In 
the event of either of these occurring, an alternate mechanism is needed whereby 
the system can be brought back up again and recovered to a stable state. The 
technique presented in this research accomplishes this.  
! An important aspect to be noted is that the proposed method clearly satisfies the 
following authentication requirements of electronic evidence documented by the 
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Criminal Division, United 
States Department of Justice [5]: 
1. Verification of the authenticity and prevention of the alteration of computer 
records. This is achieved through the use of the authentication traces and the 
challenge response mechanism. 
2.  Establishment of the reliability of computer programs. This is achieved 
through the use of application fingerprints. 
5 
 
3.  Identification of the author of computer-stored records. This is achieved 
through the use of user fingerprints. 
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CHAPTER 2 
  SYSLOGS 
2.1 Syslogs Thus Far 
This research provides a mechanism that validates and authenticates syslogs for 
computer forensic analysis. Syslogs are often smoking guns [6] in an organization 
wherein a computer or network attack has occurred due to the immense amount of 
information contained therein. Syslogs may also contain evidence of illegal or 
inappropriate activity by the user of an individual system. Traditionally, when computer 
evidence needs to be collected, the entire system is taken off-line, and the entire hard 
drive treated as evidence. With a network attack, there could be evidence in syslog files 
throughout the entire organization. This makes it unfeasible to take the systems with 
potential evidence off-line, especially when considering the frequency at which network 
based attacks actually occur. Since syslog entries are traditionally duplicated on a central 
repository, the syslog facility provides a means by which the evidence can be collected 
without taking systems off-line, assuming of course the syslog files can be made to be 
legally admissible. 
Computer forensics, a relatively new field of research, needs a method with 
appropriate authentication mechanisms in place by which syslogs can be used as relevant 
evidence in court. Syslogs, which have been designed more from an event logging 
perspective than an evidence-oriented one, are system treasure maps that chart and 
pinpoint attacks and attack attempts. More importantly, syslogs have primarily remained 
what they originally were—insufficient and cryptic [7]. Over the past few years, research 
on securing syslogs has yielded enhanced syslog protocols that focus primarily on tamper 
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prevention and detection. However, many of these protocols, though effective from a 
security perspective, are inadequate when forensics needs comes into play. 
Over the past years, system log research has focused on securing syslogs and has 
advanced a great deal [8] [9] [10]. However, syslog security research cannot validate 
syslog entries or vouch for their authenticity with regard to the time of their creation. 
Therefore, what is needed is a mechanism that can validate every entity associated with a 
syslog entry for the log entry to be forensically viable. 
The BSD syslog protocol documents one of the fundamental tenets of the syslog to be 
simplicity. With this as the basic focus, UDP is used [2] to transmit syslogs generated by 
the systems on the network to a centralized logging system. The simple format of the 
syslog entry and the vulnerable protocol used to transmit it makes syslogs very weak 
evidence; this is mainly because the integrity of syslog entries can be challenged [3]. 
The goal of the research presented here is to create a forensically viable syslog 
facility. There exists a fine difference between secure syslogs and forensically viable 
ones. Security research on logs has focused on securing audit logs and protecting them 
from intrusion and malicious manipulations. To the best of our knowledge, no research 
has focused extensively on making syslogs forensically viable. This essentially entails the 
validation of syslog entries as they are created as well as providing resistance and the 
detection of modifications and deletions. 
2.2 Background of the Proposed Method 
Every computer-based activity on a system typically leaves an electronic trace [6]. 
The level of understandability provided by these traces and the credibility offered by 
them depends on the level of security in place on the system. Electronic traces in 
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verifiable forms can be considered as digital evidence. In order to verify system log files, 
we must ensure that the log files are resistant to deletions and modifications; i.e., it may 
not be possible to prevent truncation of a log file, but such modifications must be 
detectable. Additionally, further verification must be added to the syslog protocol to 
validate where the syslog entries came from. Specifically, this is done using system 
fingerprints, user fingerprints, and application fingerprints.  
In this research, we propose a new electronic trace by using a modification of the 
Needham Schroeder protocol [11]. The secure transmission of system fingerprints, user 
fingerprints, and application fingerprints is ensured by using a modification of the 
Needham Schroeder protocol. This protocol was developed to secure communication 
between two hosts by the use of session keys, random numbers, and nonces. In this 
method, the session keys are replaced by public keys for each system on the network. We 
term the public keys assigned to every authentic system KSystem. Similar to the original 
protocol, these keys are generated pseudo randomly at the authentication module and are 
assigned to each of the systems. The weakness of the Needham Schroeder protocol lies in 
the use of timestamps. In the originally suggested protocol, timestamps were used 
explicitly. The use of timestamps explicitly enables the manipulation of messages by 
changing the network clock and manipulating network latency. However, this is 
eliminated in our proposed version due to the use of digital fingerprints, which are hashed 
values of various system parameters and timestamps. 
 
2.3 Previous Syslog Research 
Syslogs, developed as a UNIX protocol, are essentially a means of keeping track of 
events that occur and processes that run on a system. Syslogs are essential, but vastly 
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insufficient and cryptic. This is because syslogs were not designed from the perspective 
of being used as evidence or for backtracking an attack.  
Waters et al. [10] present a searchable and secure audit log using asymmetric key 
encryption. However, this paper merely tackles the problem of storing syslogs and 
providing an efficient mechanism for searching through them. The paper does not have 
any mechanism in place to verify that the entries are generated by validated systems and 
have indeed been created by systems within the secure domain. An analysis after an 
attack would not yield sufficient evidence if this method were used. Linear hash 
mechanisms that detect log tampering attempts have been suggested [9].  Ayrapetov et al. 
[8] provide techniques that secure a syslog database using passwords. Again, this 
technique lacks a mechanism to control or prevent attacks that can be carried out to 
manipulate the syslog database. Both these papers fail to present an analysis of attacks 
against their proposed systems.  
The approach in [12] presents the use of four entities—a generator server, a storage 
server, an analyzer server, and a sign server. This approach describes a secure 
infrastructure that signs the generated logs and stores them securely. However, this paper 
does not go into probing the forensic aspect of the method and how the logs secured by 
this technique can be proven to be generated by a valid and authenticated source.  
The method presented in [13] makes use of syslogd [14] and uses the SSH package to 
forward logs to the server with encryption and authentication. Since this method has been 
mainly designed to ensure secure log transmission, validation and authentication in the 
event of an attack and measures to prevent the same were not explored; i.e., there is no 
security measure enforced that can detect log tampering. Another architecture discussed 
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in [15] proposes the use of IPTables to formulate rules that will limit UDP traffic to port 
514, which is the port designated for syslog servers to run on. This method again does not 
define any kind of resilience against attacks or tampering attempts. This method at best 
simply defines a logging system that prevents any kind of attacks against the logging 
server using SSH connections and permitting communication only with certain limited IP 
addresses. There is no defense against modification of the log file should the system be 
validly or invalidly accessed. 
Other papers propose logging architectures specifically from the forensic point of 
view for use in criminal investigations. In their research, Jiqiang et al. [16] present a 
schema that describes a secure logging architecture from a forensic viewpoint. It 
describes the entire architecture as a collection of interconnected modules, namely, host, 
network, receiving, classifying, and secure. However, although the aim suggests securing 
audit logs for use in forensic analysis, the method presented by the authors does not get 
into the nitty-gritty of validating log entries and the manner in which they will actually be 
scanned for their authenticity or tested for their genuineness. The authors’ suggestion for 
the use of automated tools and data mining for analyzing the logs cannot really be 
considered as an effective scheme for verifying a syslog entry for forensic evidence due 
to the large number of false positives and false negatives data mining techniques are 
typically known to generate. 
The technique Snodgrass et al. [17] present for securing audit logs incorporates a 
database management system to store logs, a cryptographically strong one-way hash 
function to secure them, and a “validator” to judge if tampering has occurred. However, 
this method does not focus on making logs viable forensically. Although this method 
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provides a means for securing audit logs, it does not provide for validating the 
authenticity of the source, of the transaction, or of the user that generated a particular 
audit log. The opportunistic hashing technique used in their research is primarily a 
database centric technique applicable to securing transaction records [17]. A single attack 
on the database storing these records will result in the loss of every audit log. Given that 
syslogs contain the greatest amount of data relevant to an attack, it will be a primary 
interest for manipulation by an attacker. 
 
2.4 Weaknesses of the Syslog Protocol 
The weakness of the syslog protocol [3] lies in the fact that it uses the user datagram 
protocol (UDP), a connectionless and unreliable protocol, stores system event 
information in plain text format, and transmits system event data across the network in 
plain text format. With regard to the three components of security—authenticity, 
confidentiality, and integrity—syslogs can be manipulated by a malicious insider or an 
outside attacker by exploiting these inherent weaknesses. Thus, all three components 
expected of security can be violated. 
2.4.1 Compromising the Authenticity of Syslogs 
 
Syslogs typically contain an immense amount of information about network and 
system activities. The immense size of syslog files, which is a valuable repository of 
evidential information, becomes a vulnerability. Syslog entries are stored independent of 
each other; i.e., there is no systematic chaining of log entries in a syslog file. Log entries 
are, in fact, independent of every other item in a particular log file.  
Additionally, there is no relationship between the system and the facility that 
generates a syslog entry. Further, no authentication mechanism exists by which syslog 
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entries can be validated and be claimed to have originated from one system and one 
facility. By exploiting this, an attacker can send random and spurious entries to the syslog 
file by spoofing source addresses, which could be either completely incorrect or spoofed 
from a legal and authentic system. Tools such as netcat, crypt-cat, etc., can be used to 
carry out this spoofing. In the event that several attackers carry out such planned flooding 
in parallel, the impact would be sufficient to cause a denial of service attack against the 
syslog server. Since syslogs seldom have a dedicated server, this kind of attack will also 
bring down other applications that reside on the same server. 
2.4.2 Compromising the Confidentiality of Syslogs 
 
Syslogs are a lucrative source of evidence of electronic activities that happen in an 
organization. In spite of this, as originally developed, syslog entries are still transmitted 
in plain text and are even stored centrally in an unencrypted form.  With the ease at which 
open-source network tools are available off the Internet, a readily available tool such as 
tcpdump can be used to sniff syslog entries being transmitted to a central logging 
repository. By sniffing and analyzing these entries, an attacker, aside from attacking the 
systems themselves, can determine precisely how to inject messages into the syslog file.  
2.4.3 Compromising the Integrity of Syslogs 
 
Syslogs that are stored on a central logging repository are accessible to only the root 
user or the system administrator. An attack on the central repository and the procurement 
of root access enables access to all the system logs. The logs are then open to one or more 
of the following attacks—multiple entry deletion, malicious modification, abrupt 
truncation, or complete deletion. Furthermore, UDP traffic can be sniffed, replayed, and 
manipulated, thereby making syslog entries highly questionable. Attackers will often 
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delete entries related to their activity to avoid detection. Simultaneously, this prevents the 
syslogs from being effective forensic tools for legal admissibility.  
2.5 Forensic Requirements 
Dixon [18] identified the primary characteristics that computer forensic evidence 
entails. These include: 
! Preservation 
! Identification 
! Extraction 
! Documentation 
! Data Interpretation 
! Confidentiality 
! Integrity 
! Availability 
These are discussed in detail below as well as how our proposed techniques more 
fully fulfill the requirement. The goal of our research is to integrate more of these 
requirements than has traditionally been done. For instance, while secure log files add a 
level of identification, they are greatly lacking in terms of evidence identification, 
preservation, and extraction. Our proposed technique attempts to fulfill these first three 
requirements for forensic viability while maintaining the confidentiality and integrity 
provided by recent research in secure log files.  
 Bishop [19] specifies that any secure system needs to safeguard the following three 
components: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. A compromise of any of these 
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components will render the system as insecure. A syslog is secure if it maintains its 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. In terms of forensics, data will generally not be 
forensically viable if the system collecting and storing the data is not secure as a starting 
point. 
2.5.1 Preservation 
In our technique, the use of user fingerprints, application fingerprints, and system 
fingerprints validates all the entities involved in the generation of a single syslog 
message. The authentication traces stored on each system provides sufficient information 
to backtrack an event that might have occurred.  
2.5.2 Identification 
Authentication traces can be exemplified as local, simpler, copies of syslog files with 
the difference that they contain fingerprints and timestamps. When an incident occurs and 
syslogs have to be analyzed, the local copies of the authentication traces can serve as 
additional evidence to back up the facts presented by the central system log entries. 
2.5.3 Extraction 
The authentication traces that belong to a particular system must be stored in an 
encrypted format. Thus, only system administrators would have the privilege to decrypt 
and read the locally stored authentication traces. This greatly limits attacks, as individuals 
will not know what they are attempting to attack. For instance, attempting to inject events 
is difficult without knowing the contents of the files. Similarly, access must be limited to 
read-only to limit the potential for modification. In general, system log files should only 
be appended to in order to limit their susceptibility to attack.  
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2.5.4 Documentation 
The chain of custody after the acquisition of digital evidence ought to be documented 
correctly. 
2.5.5 Interpretation of the Data 
Computer evidence is typically not in a human-understandable form. In order to elicit 
appropriate responses from the jury, when digital evidence is very technical, an expert 
witness is required to interpret these results in a court of law. The authentication traces in 
our proposed method can be used as evidence to reinforce the prosecuted claims. 
Computer forensics is a two-stage process that typically comprises:  
The method presented in this paper tackles the first stage of this process. 
2.5.6 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality refers to the concealing of a resource or a system from entities that 
“do not have the need to know” [19: 4]. The read access right for syslog files essentially 
belongs to the system administrator who has root privileges. The administrator should not 
be granted privileges to “write” to the syslog, regardless of whether it is stored locally or 
centrally, because this would defeat the very concept of a syslog being a log of events as 
they happen. This can be enforced through: 
! Well-defined access control rights for system users 
! Password files encrypted and not stored locally 
! Encrypting syslogs  
! Remote logging 
! Modifying the location of the logging host in the syslog.conf file 
16 
 
2.5.7 Integrity 
 With respect to a secure syslog, integrity refers to the trustworthiness of the data it 
contains. It also refers to the integrity of the entities that generate the log entry, the 
integrity of the medium that transmitted the entry, and the integrity of the system that 
actually stores the data. The information presented by the syslog files should be accurate 
and should be trustworthy enough to be used as evidence by a forensic expert or an 
administrator. A syslog file that contains spoofed or tampered entries is not forensically 
viable. Integrity mechanisms fall into two categories: prevention and detection. 
Prevention mechanisms seek to maintain the integrity of the data by jamming any 
unauthorized attempts to access data and modify it in unauthorized ways. A more 
challenging task would be to prevent an authorized user from modifying the data in 
unauthorized ways. Strict authentication mechanisms on the host and the server can help 
enforce this kind of integrity check. More importantly, if remote logging is indeed being 
used, ports on the logging server should be filtered appropriately.  
Detection mechanisms on the other hand do not try in any way to prevent intrusions 
into the system or in any way to safeguard the integrity of information stored on it. 
Instead, detection mechanisms simply identify and log all accesses. Particular attention is 
paid to identifying who made specific access, when the accesses occurred, and what was 
done during the access.  
Most contemporary systems today incorporate characteristics from both prevention 
and detection. Essentially, the system uses access authentication to limit access but goes 
under the assumption that no prevention technique is 100% accurate and thus also records 
all accesses as per strict detection mechanisms. 
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2.5.8 Availability 
Availability refers to the availability of syslog data when needed. If they have 
adequate information on log transmission, attackers can launch a denial of service attack 
with the goal of preventing the central repository from receiving event entries. 
 
2.6    Syslog Variants 
In our goal to develop new techniques for creating forensically viable syslog 
facilities, we examined existing capabilities to identify what existing work we could draw 
from and build upon, rather than doing the entire research from scratch. The two existing 
systems dealing with secure syslog facilities that offer the greatest capability on which to 
build are syslog-sign and syslog-auth. Other variants such as syslog_reliable [20] and 
syslog_ng [21] do not provide any form of forensic credibility. 
While many of the below mentioned capabilities provide improved validation and 
authentication from a security perspective, these improvements are insufficient for 
forensic validity, i.e., for legal admissibility. These existing capabilities are not sound 
enough to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an attack occurred and the characteristics 
of that attack. Extending current capabilities to this level is the goal of our research. 
2.6.1 Syslog-Sign 
This protocol defines three types of messages: normal messages, signature blocks, 
and certificate blocks. It typically transmits to the central repository a signature block 
after a certain number of syslog message packets have been transmitted [22].  
The limitations of this system include the ability for an attacker to flood the syslog 
server with plausible-looking messages, signature blocks, and certificate blocks [23]. 
Since the number of messages after which a signature block is generated is fixed, a wily 
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attacker can eliminate the very presence of these signature blocks. This protocol warrants 
the online construction of hash tables, which increases overhead costs. 
2.6.2 Syslog-Auth 
This version of syslog uses a shared-key principle. It works on the basis that the 
syslog packets are encrypted at every hop using the keys of the previous sender and the 
current recipient. The auth block comprises several blocks. Each syslog packet is parsed 
from the beginning to the end of a block. This protocol is more suited for an online 
analysis and, hence, is better than Syslog-sign [23]. 
The limitation of syslog-auth is a result of the fact that the key management is a 
challenge since every device and relay has its own key. Further, the routing of messages 
through different relays further complicates key management. Since an attacker knows 
that the auth block is appended to a syslog message, the attacker can rip off the block 
entirely, thereby destroying the authentication mechanism that the syslog-auth actually 
provides. Finally, this protocol does not provide for origin authentication or validation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE PROPOSED METHOD 
3.1 Overview of the Proposed Method 
Figure 3.1 shows an overview of the system proposed in this paper. Currently, in 
order for syslogs to be worthy of being considered as evidence in forensics, what is 
needed is an authentication mechanism that reinforces and authenticates what the system 
log file presents. The entities involved are the user, the application, the system, the client 
syslog daemon, the authentication module, and the syslog server. The client syslog 
daemon and the syslog server are not shown explicitly in this overview diagram.  
In our proposed protocol, there are two servers, an authentication server and a logging 
server. The authentication server records every authentication that occurs and maintains 
their timestamps. Since this server needs to act as a form of backup in the event that  
 
 
Figure 3-1. View 1 of overview of the proposed method. 
Stores authentication traces for eac  h
authentication communication that User System happens between itself and the Authentication ModuleUser Application authentication module
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system logs on the logging server are tampered with or additional evidence is needed to 
verify a claim, it will have a minimum number of processes running, limited accessibility, 
and constrained resource availability. Further, this server can decipher the entries in the 
individual prints and verify the authenticity of a fingerprint. The logging server stores 
actual log entries and is the main storage system for these log entries.  
In addition to the background processes of syslog generation and authentication trace 
generation, which are umbrella processes that exist throughout a session, the proposed 
approach comprises three main active steps. 
User authentication: This is based on desired login authentication procedures and is 
geared toward ensuring that only authorized users access the system. The user is 
authenticated by the server.  
Challenge response before the user, system, and application become active:  This 
step encapsulates and comprises the generation of user fingerprints, application 
fingerprints, and system fingerprints. Furthermore, in order to cement and secure the 
transmission of these fingerprints and the authentication traces, which are generated by 
individual systems, several challenge response steps have been incorporated. 
Messages log the termination of the application, logging off of the user, and the 
shutting off the system: This is an authentication mechanism primarily focused on 
ensuring that the same entity that has been granted login privileges has logged in and is 
the entity sending event messages. However, with regard to computer forensics, a 
mechanism to verify the termination of an authorized entity is also needed.  This step 
details a secure and logged termination of the entities involved in the generation of a 
syslog entry. 
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3.2  The Proposed Method 
Our proposed protocol, exemplified in Figure 3.2, proceeds through the following six 
phases: 
1. User authentication 
2. System connection establishment 
3. System connection establishment response 
4. Application event entry generation 
5. Applications termination 
6. System connection termination 
3.2.1 Phase 1: User Authentication 
This step uses the basic credentials that a user needs to log onto the system—their 
user name and password. The authentication module verifies the authentication pair and 
sends back an acknowledgment. 
 
System Log Challenge-Response Authentication
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System
Server
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Syslog
Server
Syslog Activity on the Server
Client
Syslog
Daemon
Application
1.A Username and Password
4.A Launch Application
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3. {Systemprint, Userprint, RandomNumber-1, NONCE}KSystem
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5. {TerminateMessage, App_print, Systemprint}NONCE      .
6. {TerminateMEsage, Userprint, Systemprint}
Authentication Trace Generated and Stored
After Each Message
Authentication Traces on
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Figure 3-2. View two of overview of the proposed method. 
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3.2.2 Phase 2: System Connection Establishment 
{systemprint, userprint, randomNumber}KSystem 
The systemprints and userprints are used to establish the fact that a particular system 
has logged onto the network and is being used by a specified user. The randomNumber is 
used to emphasize the one-time nature of the communication.  A validation mechanism is 
in place on the server to verify randomNumbers and catch suspicious duplications of the 
random numbers, if any, i.e., the random numbers should not be reused. The 
authentication server would notice that that the particular random number has been used 
already and more importantly, it has replied to the message. 
Since, by definition, we cannot guarantee the uniqueness of random numbers, they 
are not used in isolation. Even if the random numbers are repeated, the authentication 
streams (here, digital fingerprints) that they are used to create will still be unique. This is 
because the fingerprints, as previously stated, are a function of several parameters and a 
random number is just one of them. More importantly, even if random numbers happen to 
be repeated, the streams that they are a part of, namely, the fingerprints and the challenge 
response, will be unique. 
3.2.3 Phase 3: System Connection Establishment Response 
{systemprint, userprint, randomNumber-1, NONCE}KSystem
This message is sent in reply to the connection establishment message sent by the 
client. The use of the nonce here signifies the one-time nature of the communication. If 
an intruder sniffed this message and tried to replay it, the replayed message would have 
no consequence on the network, and would in fact identify the presence of the intruder. 
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The randomNumber is the same as the one sent initially by the client. The nonce 
functions as a kind of a one-time key to be used by the users. 
3.2.4 Phase 4: Application Event Entry Generation 
{userprint, app_print} NONCE 
The nonce is used to prevent any form of man-in-the-middle attack. The key used is 
the nonce transmitted by the server in the previous communication. The one time nature 
of the nonce prevents an attacker from launching a man-in-the-middle attack since the 
key is generated for each system uniquely and is meant to be of a one-time nature. 
3.2.5 Phase 5: Applications Termination 
{terminatemessage, app_print, system_print}NONCE
This message logs the actual termination of an application. In order to be able to 
validate information forensically that can be used as evidence, it is necessary to be able to 
validate the time at which an application has been terminated. Events received after 
application termination would be indicative of an intruder or compromise. 
3.2.6 Phase 6: System Connection Termination 
{terminatemessage, user_print, system_print}NONCE
This message is sent by the client system when either the system shuts down or the 
user logs off. This again aids in validating event entries and limits the ability of an 
intruder to compromise the log reporting facility. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FIINGERPRINTS AND AUTHENTICATION TRACES 
 
In physical forensics, fingerprints are one of the key factors that reveal evidence 
about the perpetrator or identify key entities (people or objects) involved in a crime. 
Creating digital versions of fingerprints of every entity involved in the generation of a 
syslog entry promotes and emphasizes the need to make every entity responsible for 
ensuring its forensic viability. 
 
4.1 User Fingerprints 
User fingerprints tightly bind the user and the system used. The user print can be 
considered as simulating a real life fingerprint. When a fingerprint is considered in the 
real world, factors such as location and time are also taken into account before arriving at 
conclusions. Thus, for the cyber version of user fingerprints, similar types of information 
must be included, i.e., user identifying characteristics, time, and system identifying 
characteristics. This ties a specific user to a particular system at a specific time. More 
specifically, we propose using the following to create a user fingerprint: 
! Username and password 
! System MAC address 
! Login time 
Clearly, much of this information could be individually compromised or improved 
upon. However, the compromise of these individual components should be identifiable. 
Additionally, should the resources be available, more secure paradigms can be used. For 
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instance, the Air Force requires use of physical access cards to log into any computer 
system that would provide greater integrity than usernames and passwords alone. 
Attempts to compromise the individual components would fall back onto typical 
computer security paradigms. For instance, the server should identify the fact that the 
time used by the client system is unacceptably out of scope with the server’s time. A 
compromise of the system MAC address would be identifiable through duplicate MAC 
addresses, the change in router paths to the MAC address, or detection of an invalid mac 
address. 
 
4.2 Application Fingerprints  
     Application fingerprints are similar to user fingerprints. The application 
fingerprint will be generated for every application that is launched on a system. Their 
primary role is to identify and distinguish between legal applications and illegal ones 
launched by specific users on a system. As with user fingerprints, the goal is to provide as 
much identifying information as possible. In this case, we are attempting to validate what 
application is being run, by whom, when, and from where. Thus, application fingerprints 
would use the following pieces of information: 
! Launch time 
! Username 
! System mac address 
! Application identifier 
In a large system, every application on the system would have a different application 
identifier. In our current view of the model, application identifiers are generated on the 
fly, and the identifiers that are generated for each application are documented. As with 
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system connection establishment, the randomly generated application identifiers are not 
used in isolation due to the lack of guaranteed uniqueness of the identifiers. Further, 
when application IDs are logged in authentication traces, they have the application name 
logged with them as well to aid in differentiation. 
 
4.3  System Fingerprints 
System fingerprints are often used by operating systems manufacturers to register the 
system on which the operating system was installed and ensure it is not transferred to a 
new system in violation of the operating system license. The concept of system 
fingerprints essentially relies on the fact that once deployed most systems rarely have 
their configuration change, especially in business environments. For home users, while 
some sophisticated users upgrade individual components of their system, the majority of 
home users will not. Many different characteristics can be used to identify a system 
uniquely. Some possibilities include: 
! The number of processors 
! Disk space 
! System mac address  
! CPU ID 
! Installed applications 
! Disk drive identifier, serial number 
We have actually found that each individual hard drive has a unique serial number 
that is installed in the hard drive bios that is generally read only and is accessible using 
free programs available on the net [24]. This identifier should prove to be particularly 
effective as a system fingerprint. 
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4.4  Fingerprint Generation 
User fingerprints, application fingerprints, and system fingerprints are generated 
using the RS hashing algorithm, which is known to have low collision rate. The RS 
algorithm, which is a general-purpose hashing algorithm developed by Robert Sedgwick 
[25] is used to generate hashes, i.e., fingerprints. 
Sedgwick’s hashing algorithm is a rotative hashing algorithm that uses rotative 
hashing. In rotative hash functions, unlike its counterpart, the values are bit-shifted. 
Sometimes combinations of both right and left bit shifts are used. For increased security, 
bit shifts are sometimes prime numbers. The intermediate value that is yielded at each 
step is added to an aggregative value. The result that is yielded is the value of the final 
aggregation. An example: 
)()(1 qtpthashhash ""#$$%& '  
 
4.4.1 User Fingerprint Generation 
For the user fingerprint, the key is a concatenation of the username, the time of user 
log in, and the user ID that was generated when s/he logged in. Keys in a hash function 
are required to be unique so as to avoid collisions and enable faster look up. The keys 
here are concatenation of three parameters that will most certainly be unique across 
logins in an organization. 
The algorithm is coded as shown in Figure 4-1. However, different keys are used for 
the user, application, and the system fingerprints. 
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4.4.2 System Fingerprint 
The system fingerprint is generated in the same way. We have found that the hard 
disk serial ID that is hardcoded by a manufacturer is the only unique parameter than can 
actually distinguish one system from another. The hard drive serial IDs, which are 
assigned to every partition on the hard drive, were another parameter that was considered. 
However, these IDs can be changed when the disk is reformatted. Another parameter that 
was considered was the CPU ID. A run of an application on laboratory systems revealed 
that all CPU IDs that belong to computers ordered in bulk are the same. The MAC 
address was not considered as a potential parameter due to the ease by which a person 
with reasonable computer knowledge can change and even spoof a MAC address. The 
key used in this case is the hard disk serial ID. This was identified and verified to be  
for(int keyLength=0;keyLength<fingerPrintKey.length();keyLength++){  
    long intermediateUserChar = (long) fingerPrintKey.charAt(keyLength); 
   fingerPrintH = (fingerPrintH << 4) + intermediateUserChar; 
   fingerPrintG = fingerPrintH & 0xF0000000L; 
   if (fingerPrintG != 0) 
  fingerPrintH ^= fingerPrintG >>> 24; 
   fingerPrintH &= ~fingerPrintG;  
} 
return (long)(fingerPrintH); 
 
This user print yields! 155990563 
Figure 4-1. User fingerprint generation. 
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unique. Therefore, the hard disk serial ID and the system bootup time are together used as 
a key for generating the system fingerprint. The system print is generated as shown in 
Figure 4-2. 
 
4.4.3 Application Fingerprint 
The application fingerprint is necessary in order to validate applications. Here, a 
concatenation of the username, application ID, and the applicationTimeStamp is used as 
the key in the fingerprint generation (see Figure 4-3).  
The extent of this implementation is the generation of the authentication traces, 
digital fingerprints, and the simulated syslog entries. The implementation was carried out 
with the aim of deriving a prototype of the proposed method. The challenge response 
mechanism was incorporated as part of the remaining implementation. 
 
systemFingerPrint(){ 
    String HDDSerialNumber= "97LET9BET"; 
    String systemFingerPrintKey= 
HDDSerialNumber.concat(systemBootupTime);      
      
    for(int keyLength=0; 
keyLength<systemFingerPrintKey.length();keyLength++){ 
      long systemIntermediateChar=(long) 
systemFingerPrintKey.charAt(keyLength); 
   systemPrintH = (systemPrintH << 4) + systemIntermediateChar; 
     
   systemPrintG = systemPrintH & 0xF0000000L; 
   if (systemPrintG != 0) 
   systemPrintH ^= systemPrintG >>> 24; 
   systemPrintH &= ~systemPrintG;  
 } 
return (long)(systemPrintH);     
} 
  
An example of a system fingerprint yielded by this method ! 161044579 
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Figure 4-2. System fingerprint generation. 
applicationFingerPrint(String applicationName, long applicationID, String 
appLaunchTimestamp) {     
     
  for(int 
keyLength=0;keyLength<applicationFingerPrintKey.length();keyLength++){ 
    long appIntermediateChar = (long) 
applicationFingerPrintKey.charAt(keyLength); 
   appPrintH = (appPrintH << 4) + appIntermediateChar;   
   appPrintG = appPrintH & 0xF0000000L; 
   if (appPrintG != 0) 
   appPrintH ^= appPrintG >>> 24; 
   appPrintH &= ~appPrintG;  
   } 
  return (long)(appPrintH);} 
   
An example of an application print yielded by this method!76274804 
 
Figure 4-3. Application fingerprint generation. 
 
4.5  Authentication Traces 
An authentication trace is an entry that is generated on every system on the network 
and records the generation of system, user, and application fingerprints along with the 
associated timestamps. Authentication traces on each system can be viewed only by 
administrators. The traces are typically a message along with the prints and the timestamp 
of the event. 
The RS algorithm, which is a general-purpose hashing algorithm developed by Robert 
Sedgwick [25] is used to generate hashes, i.e., fingerprints. A test carried out [26] shows 
that the RS algorithm had very few collisions when tested on a huge string data set. 
Examples of valid and invalid authentication traces are shown in Figure 4.4. 
 
4.6 NONCES 
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A nonce is a number that is used only once. It is typically used in protocols that aim 
to ensure secure communication and prevent any form of man-in-the middle attacks. The 
transmission of the userprint and the app_print needs to be secure. For this reason, the 
server generates a nonce that is meant to be used only for one transmission of the 
systemprint and userprint. This prevents a replay attack. Moreover, even if an intruder 
sniffed it, it would be of no consequence to the network. 
For every event that occurs on the system on the network, the syslog daemon creates 
syslog entries. The result acquisition in this research aims to be able to map back to the 
true user, system, and application that caused the corresponding syslog entry by using 
the associated authentication traces and fingerprints. 
 
steena logged in at 2007-12-30 06:46:14 with user ID 3488469706175790508 with
user finger print 88726020 The system print is 94173252 
 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\IEXPLORE.exe launched  at 2007-12-30 
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06:47:26 with ID 4384844220178160764 with fingerprint 223266966 
 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\IEXPLORE.exe terminated  at2007-12-30 
06:51:13 with ID 4384844220178160764 with fingerprint 223266966 
(a) 
Incorrect login with username: ghost occurred at2007-12-28 23:01:16 with 
userID 2221344687639655740with userprint 238806054 
(b) 
Figure 4-4. Example authentication traces. (a) A valid authentication trace. More 
specifically, the authentication trace of a user named “steena” logging in and launching 
Internet Explorer. (b) The authentication trace of an invalid login. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ATTACK BACKTRACKING 
5.1 Backtracking to an Attack 
Syslog entries typically comprise the following parameters—hostname, facility, 
priority, message, and timestamp. This implementation simulated a syslog logging 
facility. The purpose of this was to compare an authentication trace and be able to get to 
the fingerprint from the syslog. After an attack occurs, parameters from the syslog can be 
used to obtain the corresponding entry contained in the authentication trace. An important 
point to be noted is that time is a crucial factor in the generation of an authentication trace 
and the corresponding syslog entry. The user, application, and system are the facilities 
considered in this implementation of syslogs. Their priorities are hardcoded here since 
this implementation mainly serves as an example and validation of how authentication 
traces, and syslog entries can be used in tandem to trace back and form evidence. The 
research in [27] suggests that authentication traces can be used to backtrack to an attack. 
The authors of [28] show this can be actually carried out. This is because every parameter 
that is considered in the generation of a fingerprint can be essentially obtained from the 
corresponding syslog entry in the log file. Therefore, the authors demonstrate the way in 
which attacks detected in the syslog entry can be backtracked using a combination of the 
authentication traces, the syslog file, and the hash function (here, the RS algorithm).  
The following authentication trace shows a login by user “steena” and the 
corresponding syslog entry. 
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\ 
steena logged in at 2008-02-06 12:49:33 with user 
ID 7524389880967786033 with user finger print
 155990563 the system print is161044579 
 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\IEXPLORE.exe 
launched at 2008-02-06 12:49:41 with ID
 1524843500148472672 with fingerprint 88504721 
 
The corresponding syslog entries with format host name, facility, priority, message, and 
timestamp. 
 
localhost 4 10 steena has logged in at  2008-02-
06 12:49:33 
 
localhost 6 12 C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\IEXPLORE.exe launched at  2008-02-06 
12:49:41 
 
Repeated bad logins at a particular system will yield corresponding authentication 
traces and syslog entries. However, the occurrence of repeated bad logins will be logged 
by the authentication traces and not by the system logs, unless they are configured to do 
so. 
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Incorrect login with username: steena occurred 
at2008-02-07 04:50:02 with userID
 56032638045929763with userprint 188996098 
 
 Incorrect login with username: steena occurred 
at2008-02-07 04:50:28 with userID
 8936243886107892818with userprint 188996200 
 
 Incorrect login with username: steena occurred 
at2008-02-07 04:50:43 with userID  
2404564924573438423 with userprint 188996163 
An attack by a malicious insider causes the username, which is already known, to be 
exploited. In this simple emulation of system logs, we have explicitly logged a bad login 
instead of a series of repeated logins by a valid user. 
 
5.2 Reconstructing Fingerprints 
The user fingerprint comprises the username, the user ID, and the time of login. 
These values can be obtained from the syslog entry. A hash of these parameters using the 
RS function yields the corresponding fingerprint. The absence of authentication traces 
only reveals the persistent login by user “steena.” A closer examination of the system 
logs and its corresponding authentication trace can even possibly reveal the identity of 
the person behind the attack. A small script to check and match users who have already 
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logged in and their log in times can possibly reveal this. A more complex implementation 
aims to assign appropriate priorities and facility numbers to every entity involved in the 
system. 
An important point to be noted while logging events to a central repository is that the 
local system time for each individual system should be used instead of the server time. 
This is because authentication traces are generated and are representative of activity by 
entities on those individual systems. The use of server time would lead to 
misinterpretation of events on those systems. This was noted during the current 
implementation when entries were being logged successfully but had a clear disparity 
with regard to timestamps in their corresponding authentication trace entries. 
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CHAPTER 6 
FORENSIC VIABILITY 
 
6.1 Requirements of Forensic Evidence 
Previous research has dealt with using digital evidence in a court of law as 
documented in [29]. Forensically viable log files as defined in [30] requires that log files 
be created and stored by keeping legal investigation procedures in mind. The three factors 
to be considered when dealing with log files as evidence as suggested in [30] are:  
1. Logs must be protected against losses. In the proposed method, the use of 
fingerprints as well as the generation and secure storage of syslogs ensures the 
integrity of the syslogs. This is done through a second source of evidence—
the authentication traces. 
2. Evidence must be found within log files. The authentication traces document 
the authenticity and validity of every entity and activity involved in the 
generation of a syslog entry through explicit messages and fingerprints. 
3. Log file information should be documented for additional judicial scrutiny 
[30]. The explicit authentication traces serve as backup/reinforcing evidence 
for syslog entries. These traces contain copious amounts of validating and 
authenticating information in a succinct form. 
 
6.2 Evidence Certainty Levels 
The research in [29] assigns predefined levels of certainty to digital evidence 
collected from affected systems with C0 having the least certainty and C6 the highest 
certainty. 
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 Digital evidence needs to have a degree of certainty attached to it in order to make it 
credible, and thus for it to be legally admissible or accepted by a jury. A mapping of 
these levels of certainty to syslog files is presented in Table 6-1. 
Table 6-1. Mapping the Certainty Levels Defined in [2] to Syslog Files. 
Level 
Level 
Confidence Relationship to Syslogs 
C0 
Erroneous/ 
Incorrect 
Programmatic errors while coding the 
syslog/sylslogd protocol [3]. An attack occurs by 
exploiting this vulnerability. 
C1 
Highly  
Uncertain 
A patchy syslog file with manipulated entries. 
C2 
Somewhat  
Uncertain 
In the event of an attack, the only evidence that is 
available is the organizational syslog file. 
Distributed evidence preservation—proposed in this 
paper—has not been attempted. 
C3 Possible 
Syslog variants, namely, Syslog-sign and Syslog-
Auth, have this level of certainty. 
C4 Probable 
Syslogs and authentication traces that are stored and 
transmitted in plain text can be classified to have this 
level of certainty.  
C5 
Almost  
Certain 
This level of certainty specifies evidence to be 
tamperproof and asserts a match between 
independent sources of evidence, which in this case 
are the authentication traces and syslogs. The 
evidence at this level, however, can be erroneous due 
to temporal loss or data loss.  The currently proposed 
method belongs to this level of certainty. 
C6 Certain 
If authentication traces were validated at every 
system that they were generated on and more 
importantly, at intermediate stages in the routing to 
the syslog server, syslog evidence would then have 
this level of certainty.  
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According to Table 6-1, the evidence presented by the syslogs, which was collected 
and generated by our approach, falls into the C5 level, given the authentication and 
validation capabilities integrated into the model. On the other hand, typical syslog 
capabilities and even secure syslog facilities achieve a much lower ranking. The log files 
generated by this method can be termed as forensically viable as defined by research in 
[30].  
 
6.3 Use of Authentication Traces and  
Syslogs Under Certain Scenarios 
 
Authentication traces and syslogs can be used in other circumstances other than 
backtracking an attack, which of course, is its primary aim. The three scenarios below 
exemplify some of these characteristics. For these scenarios, consider the fictitious entity 
SecurityVille. SecurityVille is an organization in which every user has a dedicated 
system and a login username and password. Andy is the administrator; Fred is the 
forensic analyst; Steve is the malicious insider, who is also an employee; William is a 
wily external attacker; and Arby is another employee. Authentication traces are 
maintained on every system and on the server. Syslogs are maintained only on the server. 
 
6.3.1 Scenario One: Syslog File Deletion 
The SecurityVille network has been taken offline due to an attack by William. 
Knowing the immense repository of information that syslogs contain, Fred begins 
searching for the syslog file on the server. However, William, knowing this too, has 
deleted it. 
 The authentication traces serve as complimentary evidence. Although the 
fingerprints are indecipherable at a glance, a further inspection of the authentication 
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traces can yield an almost complete reconstruction of the syslog file, thereby showing the 
origin of the attack, its modus operandi, and to a limited extent the severity of the attack. 
 
6.3.2 Scenario Two: Spurious Entry Injection into the Syslog File 
During a fortnightly inspection of the syslog file, Andy notices that certain entries 
appear to be invalid, i.e., not matching the authentication traces. Clearly, someone has 
managed to alter the syslog file on the server. The corporate network logs, router logs, 
and switch logs do not reveal any suspicious activity. As it happens, the attack originated 
from an internal source: Steve has managed to gain access to the server and injected 
spurious entries into the syslog.  
An inspection of his authentication trace reveals that he has managed to install a 
rogue application on his system. His traces reveal the name of an unknown application. 
 
6.3.3 Scenario Three: Application Updates 
FortyTwo, which is an accounting software used by the employees, is scheduled to 
undergo updates every two weeks.  
In the method proposed here, before an application launches, it needs to go through 
the challenge response mechanism. The application fingerprint is then calculated on the 
fly. When the application has been updated and has to restart, its print is recalculated and 
the restart is treated as the launch of a new application. Since application IDs are assigned 
on the fly and are documented, the automatic updates would not affect the generation of 
the application prints and their transmission. Currently, the authentication trace 
generation has no mechanism to determine if an update has occurred or if the user has 
merely chosen to close and launch the application again. However, a close examination 
of the traces across systems and the system logs would reveal this update if a pattern of 
41 
 
restarting an application is seen across multiple systems. Further, since the application 
name is listed in the authentication trace, this pattern will be readily found. An 
application update occurring while the application is not running would not lead to any 
suspicious traces, the desired result. 
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CHAPTER 7 
PROTOCOL RESILIENCE 
 
7.1 Attacks Against the Challenge Response System 
We have previously discussed some of the weaknesses of the syslog protocol and 
the ineffectiveness of secure syslog facilities for use when forensic viability is required. 
Here, we discuss the specific capabilities of our proposed model and the resilience 
these capabilities provide against typical attacks that are not handled by typical syslog 
facilities. 
 
7.1.1. Phase 2: System Connection Establishment 
An intruder can easily sniff this phase’s message. However, the intruder cannot replay 
it because the intruder would need to authenticate to the particular system from which the 
intruder wishes to launch the attack. It is only after a user is authenticated and a user 
fingerprint generated that this communication can be initiated. The user fingerprint 
contains parameters known only to that user which limits the potential for compromise. 
 
7.1.2 Phase 3: System Connection Establishment Response 
Even if the message associated with this phase is sniffed, it is unreadable since it is 
encrypted and can only be decrypted by obtaining the private key from the system. 
Moreover, this is a response message, replaying it would not cause a successful attack 
since it would require the previous authentication and connection establishment steps to 
be completed successfully. 
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7.1.3 Phase 4: Application Event Entry Generation 
The nonce used to encrypt this message is generated by the server and is sent to the 
system via an encrypted transmission. Even if the intruder replays this message, it will be 
detected as a replay attempt due to the presence of the already-used nonce. 
 
7.1.4 Phase 5: Applications Termination 
At this stage, a sniffing attack will fail because of the encryption using the KSystem. 
More importantly, Nonce2 is generated only when the previous challenge communication 
is met.  
 
7.1.5 Phase 6: System Connection Termination 
Man-in-the-middle attacks fail since all the entries will be encrypted using Nonce2. If 
an intruder needs to determine the entries and the prints, the intruder will need to sniff out 
Nonce2, which is sent via an encrypted communication. 
 
7.2 Attacks Against the Syslog File 
The truncation of syslogs is currently a major issue. However, here the authentication 
server maintains logs of every authentication and challenge response that has occurred. 
Truncation in this case succeeds only in deleting the explicit entries generated by the 
systems on the network. The attacker would not be able to delete the trace in the form of 
authentication server logs that point to the entities and the authentication mechanisms 
involved in the generation of those entries. For example, deleting a chunk of successive 
entries from the logging server does not eliminate the fact that a certain event had 
occurred since the logs on the authentication server still have evidence of every 
communication that has occurred. 
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7.3  Denial of Service  
This type of attack floods the server and consumes available resources in an attempt 
to disrupt logging activity. More importantly, if authentication and logging are not 
separated, this attack has a better chance of being successful. In our proposed model, 
proper syslog entries (those that report actual events on a system) are not generated until 
a proper authentication is accomplished. Therefore, neither the syslog server nor the 
authentication server allocate resources or even log any entries before a proper challenge-
response authentication can succeed. This protocol is therefore resilient against the denial 
of service and flooding attacks—two very frequent attacks. 
 
7.4 Abusing Privileges 
A trusted user can abuse existing privileges and bypass protection mechanisms to 
gain unauthorized access to the logging server and to the log entries themselves. In our 
approach, every user on the network is required to authenticate to the server using an 
authentication mechanism followed by a series of challenge response authentication. This 
authentication mechanism does not permit any kind of unauthorized write attacks. The 
write attack is eliminated on account of the user prints, application prints, and system 
prints associated with every entry. Additionally, the server is designed to be appended to 
only; any other modifications to the log file, insertions, deletions, etc. are considered 
attacks. 
 
7.5 Application Updates 
In the method proposed here, before the application launches, it needs to go through 
the challenge response mechanism. The application fingerprint is then calculated on the 
fly. When the application has been updated and has to restart, its print is recalculated, and 
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the restart is treated as the launch of a new application. Since application IDs are assigned 
on the fly and are documented, the automatic updates do not affect the generation of the 
application prints and their transmission. Currently, the authentication trace generation 
has no mechanism to determine if an update has occurred or if the user has merely chosen 
to close and launch the application again. However, a close examination of the traces 
across systems and the system logs would reveal this update if a pattern of restarting an 
application is seen across multiple systems. Further, since the application name is listed 
in the authentication trace, this pattern is readily found. An application update occurring 
while the application is not running would not lead to any suspicious traces, the desired 
result. 
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CHAPTER 8 
         CONCLUSION 
8.1 Current Scenario 
The proposed method provides a mechanism to authenticate and validate syslogs. 
Although syslogs have been researched extensively from the security perspective, they 
have not received sufficient attention from the forensics point of view particularly for 
ensuring legal admissibility. The fingerprints assigned to every entity involved in system 
log generation enables the validation of these entities. More importantly, since digital 
evidence is treated in the same way as documentary evidence [31], a means to 
authenticate and verify its authenticity is needed. The proposed method provides 
resilience against common attacks launched against syslogs—system log truncation and 
man-in-the-middle attacks, which are currently of the most significant problems, 
associated with using system logs as evidence in court. For instance, the credibility of 
system log files as evidence can easily be attacked in court and invalidated. 
With the proposed method, suspicious activity by a malicious insider can be traced 
back to him/her. His/her system identity can then be forensically verified by hashing the 
values available in the syslog file and the authentication traces, using the RS algorithm, 
and matching them with the prints in the authentication traces. This mechanism is limited 
to tracing back to insiders only. The ability to trace back to an outside attacker is beyond 
the scope of our proposed method, though the internal compromised identity would be 
identified. 
An important aspect to be noted is that the proposed method clearly satisfies the 
following authentication requirements of electronic evidence documented by the 
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Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Criminal Division, United States 
Department of Justice [5]: 
1. Verification of the authenticity and prevention of the alteration of computer 
records 
This is achieved through the use of the authentication traces and the 
challenge response mechanism. 
2.  Establishment of the reliability of computer programs.  
This is achieved through the use of application fingerprints. 
3.  Identification of the author of computer-stored records  
This is achieved through the use of user fingerprints. 
8.2 Future Work  
An extended implementation of this method should enlarge the prototype developed 
in this research to for a wider implementation that uses the actual syslog daemon and a 
central logging repository. In addition, the development of a sophisticated authentication 
module would help realize several security features and satisfy several requirements, 
which has been proposed in the above sections. 
With forensic trace back as the prime focus of this method, the important feature that 
should be focused on is that of successful attack backtracks. The accuracy of each attack 
backtrack needs to be measured and tracked. This metric is of paramount importance due 
to the sensitive nature of forensic evidence and the fact that this evidence can be used as 
crucial evidence to incriminate the culprit. 
In addition, the resilience of this method against the various attacks listed in Chapter 
7 should be tested. The strength of the communication between the individual systems on 
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the network and the servers lies in the security of the challenge response mechanism 
proposed. The list of attacks mentioned in Chapter 7 is not exhaustive and should be built 
upon as work on this method progresses. 
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